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Abstract. The security goals of an organization are realized through
security policies, which concern physical security, digital security and se-
curity awareness. An insider is aware of these security policies, and might
be able to thwart the security goals by combining physical, digital and
social means. A systematic analysis of such attacks requires the whole
environment where the insider operates to be formally represented. This
paper presents Portunes, a framework which integrates all three secu-
rity domains in a single environment. Portunes consists of a high-level
abstraction model focusing on the relations between the three security
domains and a lower abstraction level language able to represent the
model and describe attacks which span the three security domains.
Using the Portunes framework, we are able to represent a whole new
family of attacks where the insider is not assumed to use purely digital
actions to achieve a malicious goal.
Keywords: insider threat, physical security, security awareness, security
model
1 Introduction
Malicious insiders are a serious threat to organizations. Motivated by greed or
malice, insiders can disrupt services, modify or steal data, or cause physical dam-
age to the organization. Protecting assets from an insider is challenging [1] since
insiders have knowledge of the security policies in place, have certain privileges
on the systems and are trusted by colleagues. An insider may use the knowledge
of the security policies to avoid detection and use personal credentials or social
engineer colleagues to carry out an attack. Thus, the environment in the orga-
nization where the insider operates spans all three security domains, physical
security, digital security and security awareness of the employees. If the environ-
ment is represented formally, it is possible to analyze potential insider attacks
systematically.
The three security domains presented in the environment focus on dierent
elements of security. Physical security restricts access to buildings, rooms and
objects. Digital security is concerned with access control on information sys-
tems. Finally, security awareness of employees focuses on resistance to social
engineering, and is achieved through education of the employees.
The majority of formal models for the insider threat assume the insider uses
only digital means to achieve an attack. Therefore an essential part of the envi-
ronment of interest is not captured. Indeed, a study performed by the National
Threat Assessment Center in the US (NTAC) [2] shows that 87% of the attacks
performed by insiders required no technical knowledge and 26% used physical
means or the account of another employee as part of the attack. Thus, a whole
family of attacks, digitally-enabled physical attacks and physically-enabled dig-
ital attacks [3], in which the insider uses physical, digital and social means
to compromise the asset cannot be presented nor analyzed. An example of a
physically-enabled digital attack is the road apple attack [4], where an insider
tricks an employee into plugging a malicious dongle into a server located in a
physically restricted area. The road apple attack will be used as the main exam-
ple in the paper.
Representing all three security domains in a single formalism is challenging.
Firstly, the appropriate abstraction level needs to be found. A too low level of
abstraction for each domain (down to the individual atoms, bits or conversa-
tion dynamics) makes the representation complicated and unusable. However,
abstracting away from physical spaces, data and relations between people might
omit details that contribute to an attack. Secondly, the domains have dier-
ent properties making them hard to integrate. For example, mobility of digital
data is not restricted by its locality as it is the case with objects in the physi-
cal domain. Likewise, physical objects cannot be reproduced as easily as digital
data.
The contribution of this paper is the Portunes framework1, a framework
which integrates all three security domains in a single environment. Portunes
consists of a model and a language. The model is a high-level abstraction of
the environment focusing on the relations between the three security domains.
It provides a conceptual overview of the environment easy to understand by
the user. The language is at a relatively low level of abstraction, close to the
enforcement mechanisms. The language is able to describe attacks which span
the three security domains.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of
related work which contributed to the design of Portunes. Section 3 formalizes
the Portunes model and Portunes language. We use the road apple attack as
an example of the scenarios Portunes is designed to represent. The nal section
concludes and identies future work.
2 Related work
The design of the Portunes model and Portunes language is inuenced by sev-
eral research directions, such as insider threat modeling, physical modeling and
process calculi. This section lists several papers which inuenced the design of
Portunes and describes how Portunes extends or deviates from them.
1 After Portunes, the Roman god of keys
Dragovic et al. [5] are concerned with modeling the physical and digital do-
main to determine data exposure. Their model denes a containment relation
between layers of protection. Data security is determined not by access control
policies, but by the number of layers of protection above the data and the con-
dentiality provided by each layer. The Portunes model uses a similar relation
to present the location of elements, but uses access control policies to describe
security mechanisms. Scott [6] focuses on mobility of software-agents in a spatial
area and usage policies that dene the behavior of the agents depending on the
locality of the hosting device. The mobility of the agents is restricted through
edges on a graph. The Portunes model adds semantics on the graph structure by
giving meaning to the nodes and edges and denes invariants enforced directly
into the semantics of the language.
KLAIM [7] is a process calculus for agent interaction and mobility, consisting
of three layers: nodes, processes and actions. There are several KLAIM dialects,
including Klaim [8], OpenKlaim [9] and acKlaim [10]. The goal of the acKlaim
language is to present insider threats by combining the physical and digital
security domain. Mobility is presented by remote evaluation of processes. The
Portunes language builds upon these KLAIM dialects. Firstly, the actions for
mobility and embedding of objects (login, logout) are similar to OpenKlaim.
Secondly, the security policies expressed in Portunes language are similar to
acKlaim and Klaim. However, in the Portunes language mobility is represented
by moving nodes rather than evaluating processes. Additionally, the Portunes
language introduces delegation, whereby a node can delegate a task to another
node.
3 Portunes
This section presents the Portunes framework. We rst present the requirements
which Portunes needs to satisfy and the motivation behind some of the design
decisions. Based on the requirements, we formally dene the Portunes model and
the Portunes language. To show the expressiveness of the framework, we use an
instance of the road apple attack as an example.
3.1 Requirements and motivation
A model integrating multiple security domains needs to be expressive enough to
present the details of an attack in each security domain. In a previous work [11],
we provided the basic requirements for an integrated security model to be ex-
pressive enough to present detailed attacks. Briey, an integrated security model
should be able to present the data of interest, the physical objects in which the
data resides, the people that manipulate the objects and the interaction between
data, physical objects and people.
An additional requirement for Portunes is to restrict interactions and states
which are not possible in reality. For example, it is possible to put a laptop in
a room, however, putting a room in a laptop is impossible; a person can move
only to a neighboring location, while data can move to any location; data can be
easily copied, while the reproduction of a computer requires assembling of other
objects or materials.
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Fig. 1. Graphic presentation of Portunes
3.2 The Portunes model
To present the dierent properties and behavior of elements from physical and
digital security, the Portunes model straties the environment of interest in three
layers: spatial, object and digital. The spatial layer presents the facility of the
organization, including rooms, halls and elevators. The object layer consists of
objects located in the facility of the organization, such as people, computers and
keys. The digital layer presents the data of interest. Stratication of the envi-
ronment in three distinct layers allows specication of actions that are possible
only in a single layer (copying can only happen for digital entities) or between
specic layers (a person can move data, but data cannot move a person).
The Portunes model abstracts the environment of an organization in a graph.
The model straties the nodes of the graph in three layers and restricts the edges
between layers to reect reality. A node abstracting a location, such as an elevator
or a room, belongs to the spatial layer L and it is termed a spatial node. A node
abstracting a physical object, such as a laptop or a person, belongs to the object
layer O and it is termed an object node. A node abstracting data, such as an
operating system or a le, belongs to the digital layer D. The edges between
spatial nodes denote a neighbor relation and all other edges in the model denote
a containment relation. The ontology used in Portunes is given in Figure 2. An
edge (n;m) between two spatial nodes means n is a neighbor of m. This is a
symmetric relation where the direction of the edge is not important. For all other
nodes, an edge (n;m) means that node n contains node m; this is an asymmetric
relation.
layer node edge
spatial location
neighbors
contains
object physical object contains
contains
digital data
contains
Fig. 2. The ontology of Portunes
The above statements are illustrated in Figure 1 and formalized in the fol-
lowing denition.
Denition 1 Let G = (Node;Edge) be a directed graph and D : Node !
Layer a function mapping a node to the Layer = fL;O;Dg. A tuple (G;D) is
a Portunes model if it satises the following invariants C(G;D):
1. Every object node can have only one parent.
8n 2 Node : D(n) = O ! indegree(n) = 1
2. One of the predecessors of an object node must be a spatial node.
8n 2 Node : D(n) = O ! 9m 2 Node : D(m) = L ^ 9hm; ::::; ni; where
hm; ::::; ni denotes a nite path from m to n.
3. There is no edge from an object to a spatial node.
@(n;m) 2 Edge : D(n) = O ^ D(m) = L
4. There is no edge from a digital to an object node.
@(n;m) 2 Edge : D(n) = D ^ D(m) = O
5. A spatial and a digital node cannot be connected.
@(n;m) 2 Edge : (D(n) = D ^ D(m) = L) _ (D(n) = L ^ D(m) = D)
6. The edges between digital nodes do not generate cycles.
6 9hn; :::;mi : D(n) = ::: = D(m) = D ^ n = m
The intuition behind the invariants is as follows. An object node cannot be
at more than one place, thus an object node can have only one parent (1). An
object node is contained in a known location (2). An object node cannot contain
any spatial objects (3) (for example, a laptop cannot contain a room) nor can
a digital node contain an object node (4) (for example, a le cannot contain a
laptop). A spatial node cannot contain a digital node and vice versa (5), and a
digital node cannot contain itself (6).
Theorem 1 A graph G = (Node;Edge) in a Portunes model (G;D) can have
cycles only in the spatial layer:
9hn; :::;mi : n = m! D(n) = ::: = D(m) = L
Proof. The proof is presented in the appendix.
Example: Road apple attack To show how Portunes can be used for rep-
resenting insider threats across domains, we will use the example of the road
apple attack [4]. In this attack, an insider uses the trust of an employee (social
domain) to steal sensitive data (digital domain) from a a server in a restricted
area (physical domain).
To describe the attack, the environment in which the attack takes place needs
to include information from all three security domains. Concerning physical se-
curity, the organization has a restricted area where a server with sensitive data
resides. Additionally there is a public area where employees can socialize. Re-
garding the digital domain, the sensitive data on the server is isolated from the
rest of the network, making the data accessible only locally. The security aware-
ness of the employees is such that they trust each other enough to share oce
material (for example: CDs and dongles).
An abstraction of the environment is represented as a Portunes model in Fig-
ure 3 and 4. The nodes hall, secureRoom and world are spatial nodes, serverData
and rootkit are digital nodes. All other nodes are object nodes. In Section 3.4
we will revisit the example and show how the road apple attack takes place.
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Fig. 3. Graph of the road apple attack environment
D(hall) = D(secureRoom) = D(world) = L
D(remoteServer) = D(insider) = D(employee) = D(server) = D(dongle) = O
D(serverData) = D(rootkit) = D
Fig. 4. The function D for the road apple attack environment
3.3 The Portunes language
In the previous section, we dened a graph-based model to present the facilities
of an organization, the objects in a facility and the data of interest. This model
is on a conceptual level, and it simplies the presentation of the environment
to the user. In this section we introduce the Portunes language, which is closer
to the enforcement mechanisms. The language consists of nodes, processes and
actions, where a node in the Portunes model represents a node in the Portunes
language. The main goal of the language is to model the interaction between the
nodes in the Portunes model.
The language captures two interactions, mobility and delegation. By making
all nodes rst class citizens, every node can move. For example, a node repre-
senting an insider can move through the organization and collect keys, which
increase his initial privileges. The Portunes language lets a delegator node dele-
gate a task to a delegatee node. During the execution of the task, the delegatee
uses the privileges of the delegator. To delegate a task, the delegatee needs to
trust the delegator. For example, an insider can delegate a task to a colleague.
The colleague will execute the task only if he trusts the insider.
The above two interactions, mobility and delegation, are restricted by the
invariants from Denition 1 and by the security policies associated with each
node. Policies on nodes from the spatial and object layer represent the physical
security. These policies restrict the physical access to spatial areas in the facility
and the objects inside the spatial areas. Policies on nodes from the digital layer
represent the digital security of the organization and focus on access control on
the data of interest. In the Portunes language people can interact with other
people. Policies on people give the social aspect of the model, or more precisely,
they dene under which circumstances a person trusts another person.
Syntax As with other members of the KLAIM family, the syntax of the Portunes
language consists of nodes, processes and actions. The Portunes language lacks
the tuple spaces and the actions associated with tuple spaces, which are present
in the KLAIM family of languages, and focuses on the connections between
nodes. This is because connectivity is the main interest from the perspective of
security modeling.
N ::= Node
| l ::s P Single node
| N1 kN2 Net composition
P ::= Process
| nil Null process
| P1 j P2 Process composition
| al:P Action prexing
a ::= Action
| login(l) Login
| logout(l) Logout
| eval(P)@l Spawning
Fig. 5. Syntax of the Portunes language
The syntax of the Portunes language is shown in Figure 5. A single node
l ::s P consists of a name l 2 L, where L is a nite set of names, a set of node
names s 2 P(L), representing nodes that are connected to node l , an access
control policy  and a process P . The relation between the graph of the Portunes
model and the expressions in the Portunes language is intuitive: a node l in the
graph represents a node with name l in the language, an edge (l; l0) in the graph
connects l to a node name l0 in the set s of the node l ::s P . Thus, the node
name uniquely identies the node in the model, while the set s denes which
other nodes the node contains or is a neighbor of. These two relations identify
the relative location of each element in the environment. A net is a composition
of nodes.
A process P is a composition of actions. Namely, nil stands for a process
that cannot execute any action and al:P for the process that executes action a
using privileges from node l 2 L and then behaves as P . The label l identies a
node from where the privileges originate, and it is termed the origin node. The
structure P1jP2 is for parallel composition of processes P1 and P2. A process P
represents a task. A node can perform a task by itself or delegate the task to
another node.
An action a is a primitive which manipulates the nodes in the language. There
are three primitives, login(l), logout(l) and eval(P )@l. The actions login(l) and
logout(l) provide the mobility of a node, by manipulating the set s. The action
eval(P )@l delegates a task P to a node l by spawning a process in the node.
Example: For a node representing a room, room ::s nil, the access control
policy  denes the conditions under which other entities can enter or leave
the room. The set s contains the names of all nodes that are located in the
room or connected to the room. Let a supervisor and a person be in a hall
hall ::fperson; supervisorg nil which is neighboring the room. An example of a su-
pervisor delegating a task to a person is: supervisor ::s eval(P )@person
supervisor
where P is a process denoting the task, person is the target node and the label
supervisor is the origin node. A person entering the room as part of the task dele-
gated from supervisor is presented through person ::s login(room)
supervisor:P 0,
while a person leaving the room person ::s logout(room)
supervisor:P 00.
Depending on the privileges of the origin node which depend on its identity,
location and credentials, a node can grant a set of capabilities C = fln; lt; eg,
where ln is a capability to execute the action login, lt to execute the action
logout and e to execute the action eval. The access control policy  is a func-
tion  : (L [ f?g)  (L [ f?g)  P(L) ! P(C). The rst and the second
parameter denote identity based access control and location based access con-
trol respectively. If the identity or the location does not inuence the policy, it
is replaced by ?. The third parameter denotes credential based access control,
which requires a set of credentials to allow an action. If a policy is not aected
by credentials, the third parameter is an empty set. A security policy can present
a situation where: 1) only credentials are needed, such as a door that requires a
key (?;?; fkeyg) 7! flng, 2) only the identity is required, such as a door that
requires biometrics information (John;?; ;) 7! flng or 3) only the location is
required, such as data that can be reached only locally (?; oce; ;) 7! flng.
The policy supports combinations of these attributes, such as a door requiring
biometrics and a key (John;?; fkeyg) 7! flng. The least restrictive policy that
can be used is: (?;?; ;) 7! fln; lt; eg.
grant(lo; t; a) = 9k1; k2 2 L [ f?g;9K 2 P(L) : a 2t(k1; k2;K) ^
(k1 = lo _ k1 = ?)| {z }
(1)
^ (k2 2 parents(lo) _ k2 = ?)| {z }
(2)
^(K  children(lo)| {z }
(3)
),
where parents(lo) = f lpoj lpo ::pospo R 2 N ^ lo 2 spog and
children(lo) = f soj lo ::oso R 2 Ng
lt ln l =
8<:
true i (D(lt) = L ^ D(l) = O) _ (D(lt) = O ^ D(l) = D)
lt ln l i D(lt) = D(l)
false otherwise
.
where l e lt =
(D(l) 6= L ^ D(lt) 6= L)| {z }
(4)
^:(D(l) = D ^ D(lt) = O)| {z }
(5)
^ (lt 2 children(l)| {z }
(6)
_(9lp ::psp R 2 N : l 2 sp ^ lt 2 sp| {z }
(7)
) _ D(lt) = D| {z }
(8)
)
Fig. 6. Auxiliary function grant and  relations
Auxiliary functions Having dened the behavior of nodes using three prim-
itive actions, we now look at the context where these actions can be executed.
A node l ::s a
l0 :P can be restricted in executing an action a from an origin node
l0 to a target node for three reasons. The origin node might not have sucient
privileges, execution of the action a invalidates the invariants in Denition 1
from the Portunes model, or the target node might not be in proximity of the
node l. This section denes auxiliary functions for an implicitly given net N,
which take care these restrictions. The auxiliary functions are dened in Figure
6 and are used to simplify the operational semantics of the language.
The grant function checks if an origin node has sucient privileges to execute
an action to a target node. The rst parameter denes the name of the origin
node, the second parameter denes the policies on the target node and the third
parameter is a label of an action. Intuitively, a node can execute an action
depending on the identity lo of the origin node (1), its location parents(lo) (2)
or the keys children(lo) it contains (3). Note that the value of grant depends
solely of the origin node, not the node executing the process.
The relation lt ln l states that node lt can contain node l. The goal of
this relation is to enforce the invariants 3-6 in Denition 1. From the relation,
an object node can always interact with spatial nodes and a digital node can
always interact with object nodes. The relation lt ln l provides ordering
between nodes from the same layer. The relation is dened by the user because
the ordering depends on the elements we want to model in the environment. For
example, an operating system usually can contain a le, but not vice versa. Yet,
in scenarios where the systems are virtualized, it is possible and desirable to
model a le containing an operating system. The only assumption on lt ln l
is that it does not invalidate invariant 7 in Denition 1, or put dierently, the
relation does not allow generation of cycles between nodes in the digital layer.
The ordering relation l e lt states that node l can delegate a task to node
lt by means of spawning a process. The relation restricts delegation of tasks
between nodes depending on the layer a node belongs to and the proximity
between nodes. An object node can delegate a task to a digital node or another
object node, while a digital node can delegate a task only to another digital
node. Thus, spatial nodes cannot delegate tasks, nor can a task be delegated to
spatial nodes (4), and digital nodes cannot delegate tasks to object nodes (5).
Furthermore, a non-digital node can delegate a task only to nodes it contains (6)
or nodes that are in the same location (7). In digital nodes the proximity does
not play any role in restricting the delegation of a task (8). The decision (8)
assumes the world is pervasive and two digital nodes can delegate tasks from
any location as long as they have the appropriate privileges.
The expressions from Figure 6 focus on the relation between nodes. The
grant function provides the security constraints in the language based on the
location and identity nodes, while the ln, ln and e relations provide non-
security constraints derived from the layer the nodes belong to and their location.
In addition, we put a restriction on the processes inside a node, to distinguish
tasks originating from a single node. We call such processes simple processes,
and dene an additional auxiliary function which helps determine if a process is
a simple process.
Denition 1. Let origin(P )! P(L) be a function which returns all the action
labels of a process P . A process P , which is either nil or contains actions only
from one origin node is a simple process. origin(P )  fl0g
Operational semantics Similar to Bettini et al. [9], the semantics of the Por-
tunes language is divided into process semantics and net semantics. The process
semantics is given in terms of a labeled transition relation
a ! and describes both
the intention of a process to perform an action and the availability of resources
in the net. The label a contains the name of the node executing the action, the
target node, the origin node and a set of node names which identify which nodes
are the target node contains. The net semantics given in terms of a transition
relation ) describes possible net evolutions and relies on the labeled transition
a  ! from the process semantics.
The process semantics of the language is dened in Figure 7. A node can
login to another node [login] if it has sucient privileges to perform the action
(grant) if the node can be contained in the target node (ln) and if the process is
a simple process with origin node lo (origin). As a result of executing the action,
node l enters in node lt, or put dierently, the target node lt now contains node l.
For a node to logout from a target node [logout], the target node must contain
the node (l 2 st), the origin node must have proper privileges (grant) and the
process must be a simple process with origin node lo (origin). The action results
origin(P )  flog lt ln l grant(lo; t; ln)
l ::s login(lt)
lo :Pk lt ::tst Q
login(l;lt;lo;st)          ! l ::s Pk lt ::tst[l Q
[login]
origin(P )  flog grant(lo; t; lt) l 2 st
l ::s logout(lt)
lo :Pk lt ::tst Q
logout(l;lt;lo;st)           ! l ::s Pk lt ::tstnflg Q
[logout]
origin(P )  flog origin(Q)  flog l e lt grant(lo; t; e)
l ::s eval(Q)@l
lo
t :Pk lt ::tst R
eval(l;lt;lo;st)         ! l ::s Pk lt ::tst RjQ
[eval]
l ::s P
a  ! l ::s P
0
l ::s P jQ a  ! l ::s P
0 jQ [pComp]
Fig. 7. Process semantics
in l leaving lt, specied through removing its node name from st. Spawning a
process [eval] requires both the node executing the action and the target node
to be close to each other or the target node to be digital (l e lt), the origin node
should have the proper privileges (grant) and both processes P and Q need to
be simple processes with origin node lo (origin). The action results in delegating
a new task Q to the target node, which contains actions originating from the
same origin node as the task P .
N
eval(l;lt;lo;st)         ! N1
N ) N1
[neteval]
N1 ) N 01
N1 kN2 ) N 01 kN2
[nComp]
N
logout(l;lt1 ;lo;st1 )            ! N1 N
login(l;lt2 ;lo;st2 )           ! N2 D(l) = D
N ) N2 [netcopy]
N
logout(l;lt1 ;lo;st1 )            ! N1 N1
login(l;lt2 ;lo;st2 )           ! N2 (lt1 2 st2 _ lt2 2 st1 _ D(l) = D)
N ) N2
[netmove]
Fig. 8. Net semantics
The net semantics in Figure 8 use the process semantics to dene the possible
actions in the Portunes language. Spawning a process is limited solely by the
process semantics [neteval]. To move, a node executes the logout and login
actions in sequence [netmove]. Both actions should have the same origin node
and should be executed by the same node. Furthermore, an object node can move
only to a node in its proximity, while digital nodes do not have this restriction
(lt1 2 st2 _ lt2 2 st1 _ D(l) = D). Data can be copied, which is presented by
data entering a new node without leaving the previous [netcopy]. The standard
rules for structural congruence apply and are presented in Figure 9.
(ProcCom) P1jP2  P2jP1
(NetCom) N1kN2  N2kN1
(Abs) P1jnil  P1
Fig. 9. Structural congruence of processes and nets
Theorem 1. Nodes from the object and spatial layer cannot move to remote
locations.
Proof. (Sketch) Follows from the netmove premise: lt1 2 st2 _ lt2 2 st1
Theorem 2. Nodes from the object and spatial layer can inuence only child
and sibling nodes.
Proof. (Sketch) The property follows from the premise of the eval action: e
Theorem 3. Let G be a Portunes graph and N be a network of nodes in Por-
tunes language. LetMap(N)! G map a Portunes program in a Portunes model,
such that C(Map(N);D) holds.
The transitions generated from the semantics of Portunes language do not
invalidate C(Map(N);D).
Proof. The proof is presented in the appendix.
3.4 Using the Portunes framework to calculate attack scenarios
Having dened Portunes in the previous sections, this section shows how the
framework can aid in calculating attack scenarios. The Portunes model helps
represent the environment graphically and puts constraints on structure. The
user needs to dene: (1) a net composition that corresponds to the graph with
variables instead of processes, (2) the function D, which straties the graph, and
(3) the relation ln which tells which node can be contained in which other
node.
The previous steps provide a representation of the environment of interest. It
is now possible to present attack scenarios through process denitions. The last
step (4) is to nd concrete process expressions (i.e.instantiations of the variables
in item (1) that invalidate a goal. An attack scenario can be generated by hand
or automatically, by using model checking techniques. Here we use the road apple
attack as an example of an attack scenario.
Example: Road apple attack - continued In section 3.2 we introduced the
Portunes model of the environment where the road apple takes place. We dened
the relation between the elements through a graph and their properties through
the function D. Now, we additionally dene the ln relation and the security
policies on each of the nodes.
PPPPPPPlt
l
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1. world
2. hall
3. secureRoom
4. remoteServer 1
5. insider 1 1 1
6. employee 1 1 1
7. server 1
8. dongle
9. rootkit
10. serverData 1
Fig. 10. Denition of the auxiliary relation ln for the road apple attack environment
The relation ln is dened in Figure 10 through a boolean table. For ex-
ample, cell (4,8) is the result of remoteServer ln dongle and indicates that
the remote server can contain the dongle.
Figure 11 presents the environment as a net composition. This representation
does not provide visual information about the relation between elements, as in
the Portunes model. However, the representation contains detailed information
about the security policies in place, making it suitable for analysis.
world ::
(?;?;;) 7! fln;ltg
fremoteServer; insider; hallg nil
jj hall ::(?;?;;) 7! fln;ltgfemployee; secureRoomg nil
jj secureRoom ::(employee;?;;) 7! fln;ltgfserverg nil
jj remoteServer ::(?;?;;) 7! flngfg nil
jj insider ::(?;?;;) 7! fln;lt;egfdongleg P1
jj employee ::(insider;?;;) 7! flng ; (employee;?;;) 7! fln;lt;egfg P2
jj server ::(?;secureRoom;;) 7! fln;ltg ; (?;server;;) 7! fln;ltgfserverDatag nil
jj dongle ::(?;?;;) 7! feg ; (dongle;?;;) 7! fln;ltgfrootkitg P3
jj rootkit ::(dongle;?;;) 7! fln;lt;egfg P4
jj serverData ::(?;server;;) 7! fegfg nil
Fig. 11. The road apple attack environment in the Portunes language
Having dened the environment, now it is possible to reason about possible
attack scenarios. An attack scenario is dened through generating processes in
the nodes. Figure 12 shows the dynamics of the actual road apple attack as four
processes, P1, P2, P3 and P4. All actions in the process P1 have an origin node
insider, in P2 an origin node employee, in P3 an origin node dongle and in P4
P1=logout(world):login(hall): (a )
eval(logout(insider):login(hall):logout(hall):
login(employee))@dongle (b )
P2=eval(logout(employee):login(secureRoom):
logout(secureRoom):login(server))@dongle: (c )
logout(hall):login(secureRoom)
P3=eval(logout(dongle):login(server))@rootkit
P4=eval(login(remoteServer))@serverData
Fig. 12. The road apple attack in the Portunes language
an origin node rootkit. For clarity, the labels on the actions representing the
origin node are omitted from the process denitions. The insider (P1) goes in
the hall and waits for the employee (process P1 until reaches point a). Then, the
insider gives the employee the dongle containing the rootkit, which the employee
accepts (P1 reaches b). Later, the employee plugs the dongle in the secure server
(P2 reaches c) using its own credentials and the server gives the dongle (P3)
access to the local data. When the rootkit (P4) reaches the server, it copies
all the data to the remote server. The above actions represent the road apple
attack with a dongle automatically running when attached to a computer [12].
After executing the processes from Figure 12, the data will reside in the remote
server, presented through an edge (remoteServer; data) in the Portunes model
in Figure 13.
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Fig. 13. Portunes model of the road apple attack environment after the execution of
the attack
The process denitions follow the semantics of the language. Thus, no attack
dened through processes will violate a security policy. This makes the frame-
work suitable for presenting scenarios where the insider does not violate a policy,
but achieves his goal by combining physical access, social engineering and digital
actions.
The road apple attack is just one attack scenario. An insider may gain posses-
sion of the data by using alternative routes. For example, the employee might be
tricked into letting the insider in the secure room, as shown through the process
denitions in Figure 14. A proper reasoning about the data exposure requires
all attack scenarios to be available to the security professional. The Portunes
framework aids in the reasoning of data exposure, by helping answer questions
such as:
1. In which locations can an object A end up? For example, show all locations
where the server data can reside.
2. Who can reach location A? For example, show all elements who can reach
the secure room.
3. What are the scenarios that violate a specic goal? For example, show all
attack scenarios where the server data ends up in a remote server.
P1=logout(world):login(hall):eval(eval(login(remoteServer)@serverData)@server
P2=eval(logout(hall):login(secureRoom))@insider
P3=nil
P4=nil
Fig. 14. Alternative attack scenario
To answer these questions, we implemented a proof of concept implementa-
tion of the framework and used model checking to generate all possible attack
scenarios by automatically generating the processes P1 - P4. However, model
checking requires heuristics to improve the scalability and we are currently ex-
ploring other techniques for the generation of attack scenarios. We will discuss
the algorithms in more detail in future work.
4 Conclusion and Future work
This paper presents Portunes, a framework consisting of a high-level model and
a language inspired by the KLAIM family of languages. Portunes is capable of
representing attacks spanning the digital, physical and social domain. To capture
the three domains eciently, Portunes is able to represent 1) physical properties
of elements, 2) mobility of objects and data, 3) identity, credentials and location
based access control and 4) trust and delegation between people. The applica-
bility of Portunes is demonstrated using the example of the road apple attack,
showing how an insider can attack without violating existing security policies by
combining actions from all three domains.
As a future work, we plan to generate attack scenarios automatically from
environments presented through the Portunes framework. We are looking at
existing model checking techniques and heuristics to generate all possible action
traces for each of the processes. Additionally, we are interested in mechanisms to
isolate actions which contribute to an attack and automatically generate attack
trees.
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APPENDIX
Proof (of Theorem 1). The theorem follows from three properties, which we
prove in turn:
1. There are no cycles between layers.
2. There are no cycles in the object layer.
3. There are no cycles in the digital layer.
1. There are no cycles between layers
6 9hn0:::ni:::nki : n0 = nk ^ D(n0) 6= D(ni)
Lets assume that such a cycle exists:
9hn0:::ni:::nki : n0 = nk ^ D(n0) 6= D(ni)
Thus, there are at least two edges in the graph which connect nodes from
dierent layers:
9(nj 1; nj); (nl; nl+1) 2 Edge : D(nj 1) 6= D(nj) ^ D(nl) 6= D(nl+1) ^
D(nj 1) = D(nl+1) ^ D(nj) = D(nl)
From the invariants 3, 4, 5 (tabulated in Table 1) follows that such a pair of
edges does not exist.
Layer
1(L1)
Layer
2(L2)
Edge Edge
from L1 to
L2
from L2 to L1
L O + - (invariant 3)
L D - (invariant 5) - (invariant 5)
O D + - (invariant 4)
Table 1. Invariants 3,4,5 forbid any cycles between layers.
2. There are no cycles in the object layer.
6 9hn; :::;mi : D(n) = ::: = D(m) = O ^ n = m
Lets assume such a cycle exists:
9hn; :::ni:::;mi : D(n) = :::D(ni) ::: = D(m) = O ^ n = m.
From invariant 2,
9m 2 Node : D(m) = L ^ 9hm; ::::n0i 1; nii, follows
9(n0i 1; ni); (ni 1; ni). If n
0
i 1 6= ni 1 there is a contradiction with invari-
ant 1. Otherwise D(n0i 1) = O, and the analysis is repeated for the path
hm; ::::n0i 1i. Because hm; ::::n
0
i 1i is nite, at one point the path reaches
a spatial node, and n
0
i 1 6= ni 1. This again contradicts with invariant 1.
Thus, such cycle does not exist.
3. There are no cycles in the digital layer.
6 9hn; :::;mi : D(n) = ::: = D(m) = D ^ n = m
This comes directly from invariant 6.
.Proof (of Theorem 3). Suppose there is a net N1 which satises the invariants
C(Map(N1);D). Suppose exists a net N2 which is a product of a net transfor-
mation on N1. 9N2 : N1 ) N2. We need to prove that C(Map(N2);D) also
holds.
The relation ) is used in the net actions neteval, netcopy and netmove.
1. neteval does not cause any changes of the structure of the net. Thus any
execution of neteval cannot invalidate an invariant.
2. netmove removes an edge (lt1 ; l) and generates a new one (lt2 ; l). We need
to show that the
login(l;lt2 ;lo;st2 )           ! action does not invalidate any invariant.
Suppose the rule invalidates an invariant.
(a) Let D(l) = O. After logout(l;lt1 ;lo;st1 )            !, indegree(l) = 0. Latter, when
login(l;lt2 ;lo;st2 )           ! is applied, indegree(l) = 1. Thus, invariant 1 is not
invalidated.
(b) Let D(l) = O. After login(l;lt2 ;lo;st2 )           ! is applied, from ln, D(lt2) = L or
D(lt2) = O. The former case does not invalidate the second invariant by
denition. Since C(Map(N1);D), 9m 2 Node : 9hm:::lt2i ^ D(m) = S,
the latter case also does not invalidate the second invariant.
(c) The invariants 3, 4, 5 are not invalidated by the denition of ln.
(d) The last invariant is not invalidated because of the assumption in .
3. The eect of netcopy is an additional edge in the graph edge (lt; l) generated
by the relation
login(l;lt;lo;st)          !. The premise of netcopy enforces a restriction
D(lt) = D. Additional restriction comes from the relation ln, which allows
an edge to be generated only between a node from the object and digital
layer D(l) = D ^ D(lt) = O or between two nodes from the digital layer
D(l) = D^D(lt) = D. The former does not invalidate any of the invariants,
while the latter is restricted by the assumption on .
